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I.
INTRODUCTION
For over two decades, Muhammad Ali dominated the world of
boxing. 1 With his unorthodox boxing style of rarely throwing body
punches, he would eventually become the only man in history to win the
heavyweight championship three times. 2 Throughout his career, Ali was
also known for popularizing phrases and witty comments such as "float like
a butterfly and sting like a bee," and even went as far as to proclaim himself
as "The Greatest." 3 At his retirement in 1981, Ali ended his boxing career
with a tremendous record of 56 wins and 5 defeats. 4 Aside from multiple
victories in the boxing ring, however, Ali also achieved success in the
courtroom. 5
For example, in Ali v. Playgirl,Inc.6 of 1978, Playgirl, Inc. scheduled
to release an issue of Playgirl Magazine, containing a portrait of a nude
black man closely resembling Ali.7 The portrait was an artist's depiction of
a man seated on a stool in the corner of the boxing ring with both hands
taped and outstretched resting on the ropes and contained the caption,
"Mystery Man," accompanied by the verse, "the Greatest." 8 Once Ali
became aware of the February Playgirl issue and its contents in January of
1978, he viewed the portrait as offensive and brought suit in the Southern
District Court of New York to enjoin Playgirl, Inc. from distributing the
article. 9 More specifically, Ali claimed that his statutory right of privacy
and his common law right of publicity had been violated.' 0 The district
court agreed with Ali and granted the preliminary injunction."
With
regards to the boxer's right of publicity, the court reasoned that in order to
I Ali had won the Olympic gold medal in 1960 in the light heavyweight division and
would eventually retire in 1981 after losing to Trevor Berbick. Mike Morrison, Muhammad
Ali Timeline, at http://www.infoplease.com/spot/malitimelinel .html.
2 Gregory
A.
Howard,
Muhammad Ali
Biographical Sketch,
at
http://www.ali.com/article.cfm?id=26,
3 Johannes
Ehrmann, Muhammad Ali Fanpage, at http://www.float-like-abutterfly.de/indexe.html.
4 Howard, supra note 2.
5 See Clay v. United States, 403 U.S. 698, 704 (1971) (finding that the government

acted improperly by prosecuting Ali for dodging the draft during the Vietnam War). See
also Ali v. Playgirl, Inc., 447 F. Supp. 723, 731-32 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (issuing a preliminary

injunction to enjoin the distribution of a magazine containing a portrait of Ali).
6 447 F. Supp. 723 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
7 Ali, 447 F. Supp. at 724. "The cheekbones, broad nose and wide set brown eyes,
together with the distinctive smile and close cropped black hair are recognizable as the
features of [Ali], one of the most widely known athletes of our time." Id. at 726.
8 Id. at 726-27.
9 Id. at 726.
10 Id. at 726.

11 Ali, 447 F. Supp. at 731-32.
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prevent "unjust enrichment by theft of [Ali's established] good will" and
inflicting any damage upon his marketable reputation, the Playgirl issue
containing the nude portrait must be removed from circulation. 12
Recognized by a majority of states by common law or statute, the right
of publicity is an intellectual property right giving rise to liability when
"one ... appropriates the commercial value of a person's identity by using

without consent the person's name, likeness, or other indicia of identity for
purposes of trade."' 13 Generally, in a typical publicity right violation claim,
a plaintiff must prove four elements: the defendant's use of the plaintiff's
identity, the use of the plaintiffs name or likeness was for the defendant's
own commercial benefit, the use was without consent, and the use caused
the plaintiff injury. 14 In dealing with cases involving the right, plaintiffs
have often attained federal jurisdiction by also bringing claims of false
endorsement and unfair competition under Section 43(a) of the Lanham
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a). 15 Additionally, courts have differed greatly from
jurisdiction to jurisdiction with regards to the scope and degree of
protection that the right provides. 16 For example, some courts have ruled
that only "celebrities" have a right of publicity, while others have ruled that
the right is available to all persons; 17 some courts have also viewed that the

12 Id. 728-29 (citing Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 567
(1966)).
13 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 (2004). See also 4 THOMAS J.
MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION §

28:1 (4th ed. 2004)

[hereinafter McCarthy 1] (defining right of publicity as the "inherent right of every human
being to control the commercial use of his or her identity. This legal right is infringed by
unpermitted use which will likely damage the commercial value of this inherent right of
human identity.").
14 Allison v. Vintage Sports Plaques, 136 F.3d 1443, 1447 (11 th Cir. 1998). See also
Vincent M. de Grandpre, Understandingthe Market for Celebrity: An Economic Analysis of
the Right of Publicity,FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 73, 80 (2001).
15 Barbara A. Solomon, Can the Lanham Act Protect Tiger Woods? An Analysis of
Whether the Lanham Act is a Proper Substitute for a Federal Right of Publicity, 94
TRADEMARK REP. 1202, 1206 (2004). Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act provides that:
Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or services, or any container for
goods, uses in commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or device, or any combination
thereof.., which is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to the
affiliation, connection, or association of such person with another person, or as to the
origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods, services, or commercial activities by
another person ... shall be liable in civil action by any person who believes that he or she
is or is likely to be damaged by such act.
Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2004).
16 Melissa B. Jacoby & Diane L. Zimmerman, Foreclosing on Fame: Exploring the
UnchartedBoundaries of the Right of Publicity, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1322, 1336-37 (2002).
17 Compare Ali, 447 F. Supp. at 729 (requiring that the plaintiff achieve some degree of
celebrated status), with Cohen v. Herbal Concepts, Inc., 473 N.Y.S.2d 426, 431 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1984) ("The legislative protection is clear, extending to 'any person' within the general
public, not merely to those with a publicly identifiable feature.").
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right of publicity is preempted by federal copyright laws, while others have
not.

18

However, perhaps the most important and controversial difference in
the rulings of courts regarding the right of publicity is the varying
considerations given to the freedom of speech and of the press guaranteed
by the First Amendment of the Constitution, 19 more specifically an artist's
or author's artistic expression. 20 Additionally, since the right of publicity is
a state granted right, tensions also exist regarding the Fourteenth
Amendment, which states that "[n]o state shall make or enforce any law
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States." 2 1 The Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition states that the
right of publicity does not provide protection for "the use of a person's
identity in news reporting, commentary, entertainment, works of fiction or
in advertising that is incidental to [commercial] uses." 22
By not
considering any freedom of expression guaranteed by the First Amendment,
the district court in Ali seems to have given too much deference in
protecting a person's right of publicity. Similar decisions relating to the
right has caused a growing tension between the right and the First
Amendment freedom of expression and the use of one's identity for
commercial purposes, leaving courts to adopt and apply different and
inadequate standards or refusal to address the issue at all.2 3 Consequently,
a workable standard or exception must be adopted in order to respect First
Amendment rights and provide a more uniform body of law within
intellectual property.
This Note addresses the right of publicity of not just famous athletes,
but any person and its possible coexistence with the established right of
artistic expression guaranteed by the First Amendment. Part II of this paper
provides a history and background of the right of publicity by examining
the origin of the right of privacy and the resulting development of the right
of publicity. Part III addresses some standards and tests that courts have
18 Compare Brown v. Ames, 201 F.3d 654, 657-58 (5th Cir. 2000) (ruling that the right
of publicity misappropriation was not preempted by the Copyright Act), with Baltimore
Orioles, Inc. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n, 805 F.2d 663, 674 (7th Cir. 1986)
(holding that baseball players' rights of publicity were preempted under federal copyright
law).
19 "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press .
U.S.
CONST. amend. I.
20 Jacy T. Jasmer, ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publishing, Inc.: A Workable Standard, An
Unworkable Decision, 5 MINN. INTELL. PROP. REv. 293, 299-306 (2004).
21 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
22 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 47 (2004) (emphasis added).

23 See generally ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ'g., Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 924-36, and Zacchini,
433 U.S. at 568-69.
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applied in an attempt to balance the tension between the publicity right and
First Amendment rights. Finally, Part IV suggests that a modified "fair
use" exception similar to the fair use defense of copyright law be adopted
and applied to right of publicity cases, which would provide some
protection for celebrities regarding the appropriation of their names and
likenesses and at the same time, allow creations of some qualified artistic
works.
II.
RIGHT OF PUBLICITY - HISTORY AND BACKGROUND
24
The right of publicity is a right derived from the right of privacy.
Historically, the right of privacy was considered to be a "personal,
nonassignable, nondescendible right, and early cases refused to extend the
right to a person's heirs." 2 5 Individuals in the public spotlight often felt that
this privacy right was inadequate to protect their private affairs and longed
for a broader form of protection, resulting in the development of the right of
publicity. 2 6 In order to fully understand the right of publicity and its
tension with First Amendment rights, this section outlines the development
of the right of privacy and publicity by examining several landmark cases
right Supreme Court case,
and articles, including the important publicity
27
Zacchini v. Scripps Howard Broadcasting Co.

A. The Development of the Right of Privacy
The origin of the right of publicity can be traced back to several key
influential articles and landmark court decisions, closely relating to the
development of the right of privacy. 2 8 In 1890, a Harvard law review
article, entitled The Right of Privacy, was published by Samuel Warren and
Louis Brandeis detailing the need for a common law "right of privacy" to
be adopted by the courts. 2 9 The article stated that advances in news
dissemination mediums and methods at that time, such as "instantaneous
photographs and the increased circulation of newspaper publications," were
capable of unjustly threatening the privacy of individuals by the public
Reasoning that these public
disclosure of personal information. 30
24 GREGORY

J.

BATTERSBY AND CHARLES W. GRIMES, THE LAW OF MERCHANDISE AND

CHARACTER LICENSING

§ 12:44 (2004).

25 Id.
26 Id.

27 433 U.S. 562 (1977).
28 THOMAS J. MCCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY § 1:4 (2005)

[hereinafter MCCARTHY II].
29 Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193
10.
(1890). See also MCCARTHY I, supra note 28, at § 1:
30 Tina J.Ham, The Right of Publicity: Finding a Balance in the Fair Use Doctrine -
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disclosures by the press were, at many times, overly intrusive and
embarrassing, 3 1 the authors stressed that a "right to be let alone" was
essential in order to maintain an individual's human dignity and punish
those who had an absolute disregard for a person's inherent right to enjoy
life. 32 In sum, Warren and Brandeis urged courts to provide a cause of
action in similar circumstances dealing with the press by "adopt[ing] a
common law right of privacy to protect individuals from unwanted
publicity."33 Over a decade later after the seminal law review article, the
privacy issue was confronted and decided upon34 by a New York appellate
court in Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co.
In Roberson, the defendant flour manufacturer and seller circulated
25,000 lithographic prints and photographic advertisements containing the
likeness of the plaintiff.3 5 The plaintiff alleged that the defendant unjustly
used her good name and picture and caused her great humiliation,
complaining a 'right of privacy' had been invaded. 36 Furthermore, the
plaintiff sought an injunction, enjoining the flour company from using in
any manner her likeness, and $15,000 for emotional distress. 3 7 The court,
in denying the injunction, reasoned that since a 'right of privacy' did not
exist under New York law at that time, adopting such a right would upset
the settled principles of law guiding the public regarding privacy issues and
rights. 3 8 In response to the general public disagreement to the lack of
statutory relief detailed in Roberson, the New York Legislature enacted the
nation's first privacy statute in 1903. 3 9 Currently, New York Civil Rights
Law provides a cause of action for "any person whose name, portrait,
picture or voice is used ... for advertising purposes or for the purposes of
trade without ... written consent." 40 Two years later, the Georgia Supreme

Court, in Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co.,4 1 also adopted a common
law right of privacy when a defendant insurance company used the
plaintiffs name and picture for advertising services without the plaintiffs
Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 36 U.C.

31
32
33
34
35

DAvIs.

L. REV. 543, 547 (2003).

McCarthy II, supra note 28, at § 1:10.
Warren & Brandeis, supra note 29, at 195.
Ham, supra note 30, at 547 (emphasis added).
64 N.E. 442 (N.Y. 1902).
Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 64 N.E. 442, 442 (N.Y. 1902).

36 Id. at 442-43.
37

Id. at 442.

38 Id. at 447. See also Seth A. Diamond, So Many Entertainers, so Little Protection:
New York, the Right of Publicity, and the Need for Reciprocity, 47 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 447,

450-51 (2003).
39 Scott J. Shagin, Celebrity Rights in New Jersey, 231 N.J. LAW. 15, 16 (2004)

(discussing the enactment of sections 50 and 51 of the New York Civil Rights Law).
40 N.Y. Civ. Rights Law § 51 (McKinney2006).
41

50 S.E. 68 (Ga. 1905).
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consent. 4 2 As a result of the enactment of the New York statute and the
Pavesich dispute, courts generally began to accept the invasion of an
individual's privacy as an actionable' 43tort, "creating a somewhat
disorganized and inconsistent body of law.
B. The Birth and Development of the Right of Publicity
As the body of privacy law continued to develop, courts eventually
recognized a similar but independent publicity right stemming from the
right of privacy, 4 4 as illustrated by the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit in Haelan Laboratories., Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum,
Inc.4 5 In Haelan, baseball players entered into contracts with the plaintiff
chewing gum company for the exclusive right to use the players'
photographs in connection with the sales of chewing gum.4 6 The defendant
competitor company, aware of the existing plaintiff contracts, induced the
baseball players to enter into separate contracts for authorization to also use
the players' photographs for similar purposes. 47 The defendant alleged that
people have no legal interest in the publication of their picture besides the
right of privacy, which is a personal right and cannot be assignable. 4 8 In
concluding that the first contracts were valid and pertained to a legally
exclusive right, the court stated that in addition to the right of privacy, "a
man has a right in the publicity value of his photograph, i.e., the right to
grant the exclusive privilege of publishing his picture, and that such a grant
may validly be made 'in gross,' i.e., without an accompanying transfer of a
business or of anything else." 49 Being the first to coin the phrase, "right of
publicity," 50 the appellate court reasoned that aside from emotional distress
caused by the commercial use of an individual's name or identity,
"prominent persons . . . would feel sorely deprived if they no longer
42 Pavesich, at 81 ("[T]he publication of one's picture without his consent by another as
an advertisement, for the mere purpose of increasing the profits and gains of the advertiser,
is an invasion of [the] right [of privacy].").
43 MCCARTHY II, supra note 28, at § 1:4.
44 See Ali v. Playgirl Inc., 447 F. Supp. 723, 728 (1978) (stating that courts do not
distinguish the right of privacy and the fight of publicity). However, the court also went on
to state that "[t]he distinctive aspect of the common law right of publicity is that it
recognizes the commercial value of the picture or representation of a prominent person or
performer, and protects his proprietary interest in the profitability of his public reputation or
persona."' Id. (citing Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad Co., 433 U.S. 562, 573 (1977)).
45 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir. 1953).
46 Haelan Labs., Inc., 202 F.2d at 867.
47 Id.
48 Id. at 868.
49 Id.
50 John McMillen & Rebecca Atkinson, Artists and Athletes: Balancing the First
Amendment and the Right of Publicity in Sport Celebrity Portraits, 14 J. LEGAL ASPECTS
SPORT 117, 121 (2004).
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received money for authorizing advertisements, popularizing their
countenances, displayed in newspapers, magazines, busses, trains, and
subways" and that "[the] right of publicity would usually yield5 1them no
money unless it could be made the subject of an exclusive grant."
Upon the publication of Haelan decision, Professor Melville
Nimmer responded, writing an important article in 1954, entitled The Right
of Publicity, that provided an in-depth analysis of the case and arguments
supporting a uniform recognition of the right of publicity.5 2 Widely
regarded as building the legal foundation for the right of publicity, 53 the
article further distinguished the right of publicity from the right of privacy
by stating that traditional privacy laws at that time would not adequately
protect the commercial value of an individual's identity. 54 Absent the
necessary ridicule or humiliation for a claim of privacy intrusion, Nimmer
hypothesized that "a commercial market [could] operate efficiently, similar
to the law of the traditional intellectual property rights of patents and
copyrights" only if an enforceable right of publicity was established "in the
hands of the exclusive licensee." 5 5 Nimmer argued for an assignable right
of publicity similar to property rights and placed emphasis on the monetary
value of an individual's public persona, stating that "in most instances a
person achieves publicity values of substantial pecuniary worth only after
56
he has expended considerable time, effort, skill, and even money."
Finally, considering the right of publicity as a form of intellectual property
and comparing it to other similar forms of protection, Nimmer stressed that
the commercial use of a person's identity would not necessarily implicate
endorsement or approval of a product or service, which is required along
with consumer confusion, to be actionable under trademark law and unfair
57
competition.
While courts continued to debate over the definition and scope of the
right of privacy and publicity, it was not until 1960 when William Prosser
published a California law review article, categorizing privacy invasion into
four distinct torts that would uniformly be accepted by the courts. 58 Prosser
51 Haelan, 202 F.2d at 868.
52 Melville B. Nimmer, The Right of Publicity, 19 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 203 (1954).
53 McCarthy II, supra note 28, at § 1:27.
54 Id. (citing Nimmer, supra note 52, at 204).
55 Id.
56 Jason K. Levine, Can the Right of Publicity Afford Free Speech? A New Right of
Publicity Test for First Amendment Cases, 27 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 171, 179 (2004)

(quoting Nimmer, supra note 52, at 216). Nimmer also argued that while the publicity right
of a well-known person would have a larger value, the right of publicity should be available
to everyone, not just celebrities. Nimmer, supra note 52, at 217.
57 Nimmer, Supra note 52, at 217.
58 McCarthy I, supra note 28, at § 1:4 (referring to Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV.
383 (1960)).
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argued that the right of privacy, or the right "to be let alone," encompassed
several possible torts. 5 9 The four privacy torts articulated by Prosser are:
"'intrusion' upon plaintiffs seclusion or solitude; public disclosure of
'private facts' about the plaintiff's personal life; publicity that places the
plaintiff in a 'false light' in the public eye; and 'appropriation' of plaintiff's
name or likeness for commercial purposes." 60 Although some advocates
for the right of publicity claim Prosser's article did nothing but add to the
obscurity and hindered the development of the body of law by setting
ridged guidelines and not elaborating specifically on the publicity right, the
appropriation of an individual's name or likeness for commercial purposes
eventually was recognized as the right of publicity and was ultimately
61
adopted by American Law Institute in the Restatement (Second) of Torts.
C. Zacchini and Introduction of the FirstAmendment Defense
Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co.,62 the first and only
Supreme Court case to address the right of publicity, is known for providing
justifications furthering the publicity right and considering the applicability
of the First Amendment. 6 3 In Zacchini, a "human cannonball" performer
brought an Ohio right of publicity claim against a television broadcasting
64
station for airing his entire 15 second performance without authorization.
Against Zacchini's wishes, a reporter had videotaped the act and had shown
the clip on a news program, together with favorable commentary. 6 5 The
defendant news broadcasting company claimed that the report was
privileged by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. 66 The Supreme Court
of Ohio agreed with the defendant, reasoning that although "one may not
use for his own benefit the name or likeness of another, whether or not the
use or benefit is a commercial," ' 67 "the press has a privilege to report
matters of legitimate public interest even though such reports might intrude
on matters otherwise private."68
The Supreme Court of the United States, upon review of the

59 Id. at § 1:19.

60 Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 572, n.7 (citing Prosser, supra note 58, at 403.).
61 See McCarthy H, supra note 28, at § 1:19. See also Shagin, supra note 39, at 16
("This [appropriation] tort, the historical antecedent of the right of publicity, has been
memorialized in the Restatement Second of Torts..
62 433 U.S. 563 (1977).
63 See Levine, supra note 56, at 181 ("[T]he Court relied on a mix of justifications,
citing both moral and economic rationales for the right.").
64 Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 563-64.
65 Id. at 564.
66 Id. at 565.
67 Id.
68 Id. at461.
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misappropriation dispute, enunciated three basic functions that the right of
publicity serves, analogous to patent and copyright law in order to
ultimately "advance public welfare through the talents of authors and
inventors in 'Science and useful Arts."' 69 The publicity right prevents
unjust enrichment by the theft of the plaintiffs established good will,
protects the entertainer's ability to earn a living, and "provides an economic
incentive for him to make the investment required to produce a performance
of interest to the public." 70 With regards to the Constitutional arguments,
the Court stated that entertainment, as well as, news was entitled to First
Amendment protection. 7 1 However, "[w]herever the line in particular
situations is to be drawn between media reports that are protected and those
that are not, we are quite sure that the First and Fourteenth Amendments do
not immunize the media when they broadcast a performer's entire act
without his consent," and had the broadcast company not aired the entire
performance, the outcome might be different. 7 2 In effect, Zacchini
establishes the recognition of the validity of "at least a limited state
publicity right" by the Supreme Court, but the nature of the facts of this
case and the Court's minimal analysis of the First Amendment privilege
provides little "guidance for the more common right of publicity case,
' 73
typically involving use of a likeness in advertising or on merchandise."
Some courts agree with Zacchini, while others regard the case as 7 a4
copyright fair use analysis and distinguish the holding based on its facts.
Ultimately, because of the Supreme Court's narrow holding, courts
the scope of First
applying the right of publicity and interpreting
75
Amendment rights have greatly differed in results.

69

Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 576 (quoting Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954)).

70 Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 576.

71 Id. at 574-75, 578.
72 Id.
73 See Jireh Publ'g., 332 F.3d 915, 918 (using Tiger Wood's image on a sold
Cardtoons v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n, 95 F.3d 959, 962 (producing
trading cards of famous baseball players); and Hirsch v. S.C. Johnson & Son,
N.W.2d 129, 130 (Wis. 1979) (advertising a woman's shaving cream using
"Crazylegs," which had been previously adopted by the plaintiff as a nickname).

painting);
caricature
Inc., 280
the name
See also

Jeremy T. Marr, ConstitutionalRestraints on State Right of Publicity Laws, 44 B.C.L. REv.

863, 869 (2003).
74 Jay F. Dougherty, All the World's Not a Stooge: The "Transformativeness" Test for
Analyzing a FirstAmendment Defense to a Right of Publicity Claim Against Distributionof
a Work of Art, 27 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 1, 21 (2003).

75 Levine, supra note 56, at 183.
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II.
TESTS APPLIED TO RECONCILE THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY WITH
THE FIRST AMENDMENT
The typical right of publicity case involves the use of an individual's
name or likeness for commercial purposes, such as advertising or on
merchandise. 76 Defendants in these right of publicity cases contend that the
use of the individual's identity is a form of expression and speech. 77 Even
though the defendant's use is for commercial purposes, the use becomes a
form of entertainment to the public, which has been uniformly established
to be protected under the First Amendment. 78 Courts have continually
struggled in determining exactly what elements or characteristics are
needed to qualify as a protected freedom of expression and with no
guidance from state statutes or previous case law, courts deciding freely and
differently on right of publicity claims, involving advertising or
merchandise, only added to the tension between the right and the First
Amendment. 79 To address this issue, different tests and standards were
applied by courts in an attempt to strike a balance between the right of
publicity and the First Amendment freedom of expression right.8 ° This
section addresses four popular and modern standards applied by the courts:
the "actual malice" test, "transformative" test, "artistic relevance" test, and
"predominant purpose" test.
A. The "Actual Malice" Test
The leading case for the "actual malice" test is Hoffman v. Capital
Cities/ABC, Inc. 8 1 In Hoffman, Actor Dustin Hoffman brought suit for
publicity right violations against a magazine company when an issue of the

76 See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
77 See infra note 84 and accompanying text.
78 See Cardtoons, 95 F.3d at 969 (quoting Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 510
(1948)) ("Speech that entertains, like speech that informs, is protected by the First
Amendment because '[t]he line between informing and the entertaining is too elusive for the
protection of that basic right."). But see Comedy m Prods. V. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d
797, 805 (Cal. 2001) (Courts "that have in concluding that depictions of celebrities
amounting to little more than the appropriation of the celebrity's economic value are not
protected expression under the First Amenment.")
79 See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
80 See Comedy I11, 21 P.3d at 798 (requiring that the resulting work "adds significant
creative elements so as to be transformed into something more than a mere celebrity likeness
or imitation."); Jireh Publ'g, 332 F.3d at 937 (adopting an "artistic relevance" test to
determine whether the sold paintings of a famous golfer was Constitutionally protected); and
Doe v. TCI Cablevision, 110 S.W.3d 363, 374 (Mo. 2003) (employing a "predominant
purpose" test to hold that the use of a hockey player's name for a comic book character was
a violation of the athlete's right of publicity).
81 255 F.3d 1180 (9th Cir. 2001).
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magazine displayed a computer altered picture of him with the body of a
male model, wearing a dress and high-heeled sandals. 82 The picture was an
alteration of an advertisement for a movie that Hoffman had recently starred
in. 83 Even though the magazine created the photo for the purposes of
selling the issue, the appellate court viewed the photograph as having some
expressive elements because it did not advance a commercial message and
it was "a combination of fashion photography, humor, and visual and verbal
editorial comment on classic films and famous actors." 84 In this sense,
"[a]ny commercial aspects are 'inextricably entwined" with expressive
elements, and so they cannot be separated out 'from the fully protected
whole,"' and thus are still capable of First Amendment protection. 8 5 The
court then applied an "actual malice" test in which the "[plaintiff] must
demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that [the defendant] intended
to create the false impression in the minds of its readers that when they saw
the [work] they were seeing the [original image]." '86 The defendant
87
unknowingly misleading the readers does not amount to actual malice.
The court held that Hoffman did not meet this burden and the magazine
88
photograph was entitled to First Amendment protection.
B. The "Transformative" Test
In Comedy III Productions, Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 89 the
plaintiff, Comedy III Productions, was the registered owner of all rights to
"The Three Stooges." 90 Without consent, Defendant Gary Saderup, an
artist, had produced a charcoal drawing of the trio's likeness and sold
lithographs and T-shirts containing the drawing. 9 1 The plaintiff alleged that
the publicity rights of "The Three Stooges" had been violated and sought a
permanent injunction. 9 2 Saderup claimed that enforcement of an injunction
regarding the charcoal drawing would violate his right of free speech and
expression under the First Amendment. 93 The Supreme Court of California
82

Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 255 F.3d 1180, 1183 (9th Cir. 2001).

83 Id.
84

ld. at 1185.

85 Id. at 1185-86 (citing Gaudiya Vasihnava Soc'y v. City & County of San Francisco,
952 F.2d 1059, 1064 (9th Cir. 1990).
86 Id. at 1187.
87 Hoffman, 255 F.3d at 1187.
88 Id. at 1189.

89 21 P.3d 797 (Cal. 2001).
90 Comedy II1, 21 P.3d at 800.
91 Id.
92 Id. at 801.

93 Id. at 802. Saderup also unsuccessfully claimed that the California right of publicity
statute "applies only to uses of a deceased personality's name, voice, photograph, etc., for
the purpose of advertising, selling, or soliciting the purchase of, products or services." Id. at
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established a balancing test between the First Amendment and the right of
publicity based on "whether the work in question adds significant creative
elements so as to be transformed into something more than a mere celebrity
likeness or limitation" and held the Saderup's charcoal drawing was not
transformative enough to be entitled to First Amendment protection
because
94
the drawing was a literal depiction of "The Three Stooges."
Applying principles derived from the first element of copyright
law's fair use doctrine and considering the goal of encouraging free
expression and creativity, the court examined the "purpose and character of
the use" to determine whether the new work "adds something new, with a
further purpose or different character, altering the first with new expression,
meaning, or message." 9 5 The court summarized this "transformative test"
by stating:
[T]he inquiry is whether the celebrity likeness is one of the "raw
materials" from which an original work is synthesized, or whether the
depiction or imitation of the celebrity is the very sum and substance of
the work in question. We ask, in other words, whether a product
containing a celebrity's likeness is so transformed that it has become
primarily the defendant's own expression rather than the celebrity's
likeness. And when we use the word "expression," we9 6 mean
expression of something other than the likeness of the celebrity.
The court further added that transformative uses of a person's identity
for commercial purposes can take place in many protected forms, such as
97
parody, news reporting, fictionalized portrayal and social criticism.
C. The "Artistic Relevance" Test
Aside from the "transformative" test used in Comedy III, some
courts have alternatively adopted an "artistic relevance" test to determine
whether a use of an individual's identity is protected against a right of
publicity claim. 98 For example, in the Second Circuit case, Rogers v.

801.
94 Comedy 111, 21 P.3d at 798 (emphasis added).
95 Id. at 808 (citing Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994)).
"[Bloth the First Amendment and copyright law have a common goal of encouragement of
free expression and creativity, the former by protecting such expression from government
interference, the latter by protecting the creative fruits of intellectual and artistic labor. ...
The right of publicity... shares this goal with copyright law." Id. at 808.
96 Id. at 809.
97 Id.
98 Christopher P. Beall, The Right of Publicity: Status Under Colorado Law, 33 COLO.

LAW. 27, 30 (2004) (citing Seale v. Gramercy Pictures, 949 F. Supp. 331, 337-38 (E.D. Pa.
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Grimaldi,9 9 a defendant movie producer titled a fictional film, "Ginger and
Fred" after the famous Ginger Rogers and Fred Astaire.10 0 Rogers alleged
right of publicity violations and also brought a Lanham Act claim against
the defendant movie producer for "creating the false impression that the
film was about her or that she sponsored, endorsed, or was otherwise
involved in the film."' 0 1 The court found in favor of the defendants on all
claims, holding that the use of the names for the movie title was
permissible. 10 2 In deciding the Lanham Act claims, the court employed an
"artistic relevance" test, stating that uses of a celebrity's name in a movie
title is protected by the First Amendment "unless the title has no artistic
relevance to the underlying work whatsoever, or, if it has some artistic
relevance, unless the [use] explicitly misleads as to the source or the content
of the work."' 0 3 The appellate court went on to elaborate that even if the
use of a person's name implicitly suggests endorsement, when there is
artistic relevance to the resulting work, the artistic expression prevails over
the right of publicity claim. 104 In addressing the right of publicity claims,
the court applied the same reasoning and added that relief would only be
granted if the use of the individual's name or identity was "wholly
unrelated" to the resulting work or the use was "simply a disguised
commercial advertisement for the sale of goods or services." 105
The Sixth Circuit in ETW Corporation v. Jireh Publishing, Inc.,
several years later applied this "artistic relevance," as well as the
"transformative" test to a dispute involving the sale paintings depicting
famous golfers.' 0 6 In Jireh Publishing, artist Rick Rush created a painting
entitled The Masters of Augusta, commemorating Tiger Woods' victory at
the Master Tournament in Augusta, Georgia. 10 7 The painting depicted
Woods in three different swinging poses and also contained the faces of
famous golfers who had previously won the tournament in the
background. 10 8 The court, in examining the work, felt that the painting was
not just a literal depiction of Woods. 109 The court found that there was
artistic relevance in the underlying work because the painting portrayed an
1996) and Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 1004 (2d Cir. 1989)).
99 875 F.2d 994 (2d Cir. 1989).
100 Rogers, 875 F.2d at 996.
101 Id. at 997.
102
103
104

Id. at 1005.
Id. at 999.
Id. at 1000.

105 Rogers, 875 F.2d at 1004 (citing Frosh v. Grosset & Dunlop, Inc., 427 N.Y.S.2d 828,
829 (N.Y. App. Div. 1980)).
106 See generally Jireh Publ'g., 332 F.3d at 915-58.
107
108

Id. at 918.
Id.

109 Id.

at 936.
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important and historic sporting event and Rush's addition of the past
tournament winners in the background "conveys the message that Woods
himself will someday join the revered group."'10 With regards to the
"transformative" test, the court simply stated that since the work was not a
literal depiction of Woods and consisted of a collage of multiple images and
faces, the painting had substantial transformative elements. 11 Ultimately,
the court held that the painting did not violate Woods' right of publicity
because "Rush's work has substantial informational and creative content
' 1
which outweighs any adverse effect on ETW's market." 12
D. The "PredominantPurpose" Test
In Doe v. TCI Cablevision,113 Defendant Todd McFarlane created a
violent fictional character named "Anthony 'Tony Twist' Twistelli" for his
popular comic book Spawn. 1 14 The character shared the same name as
Anthony Twist, a former profession hockey player of the National Hockey
League. 1 15 Even though the character bore no physical resemblance,
1 16
McFarlane admitted to naming the comic book character after Twist.
Once Twist was aware of the existence of the character, he filed for an
injunction and sought damages for misappropriation of his name. 1 17 The
Supreme Court of Missouri, in recognizing that this was a right of publicity
claim, declined to apply the "transformative" test, but instead adopted a
"predominant purpose" test proposed by a recent law review article.1 18 The
law review article suggested the following test to apply in cases where use
of an individual's name or likeness is both expressive and commercial:
If a product is being sold that predominantly exploits the commercial
value of an individual's identity, that product should be held to violate
the right of publicity and not be protected by the First Amendment,
even if there is some "expressive" content in it that might qualify as
"speech" in other circumstances. If, on the other hand, the predominant
purpose of the product is to make an expressive comment on or1 about a
celebrity, the expressive values should be given greater weight. 19

Id.
III Jireh Publ'g, 332 F.3d at 938.
112 Id. at 937.
113 110 S.W.3d 363 (Mo. 2003).
14 TCI Cablevision, 110 S.W.3d at 364.
15 Id. at 365.
116 Id. at 366-67.
110

117

Id. at 368.

118

Id. at 374 (referring to Mark S. Lee, Agents of Chaos: JudicialConfusion in Defining

the Right of Publicity - Free Speech Interface, 23 Loy. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 471, 493 (2003)).
119 TCI Cablevision, 110 S.W.3d at 374 (quoting Lee, supra note 118, at 500).
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The court, in applying this test, found that the predominant purpose of
McFarlane in naming his comic book character "Anthony 'Tony Twist'
Twistelli" was to obtain a commercial advantage by attracting consumer
20
attention to the product and found in favor of the former hockey player. 1
E. Relevant Problems in the Applications of Existing Tests
The "actual malice" test as applied by the Hoffman court may have
been too narrow. The test fails to consider and establish standards for
determining the distinction between commercial and noncommercial
speech.121 By merely focusing on the mindset of the defendants at the time
of the use and requiring a "reckless disregard for the truth," 12 2 the test is
inadequate to balance the right of publicity and the First Amendment. For
example, by placing a disclaimer on any product or advertisement that the
use portrays an inaccurate or false impression, the test would automatically
invoke the protection of the First Amendment. 1 23
Consequently,
widespread applications of the "actual malice" test would greatly disfavor
the right of publicity of individuals whose names and identities are used for
some commercial purpose.
Since the Comedy III decision in 2001, the "transformative" test has
been the subject of heavy criticism. 124 Lower courts within the same
jurisdiction that have attempted to apply the test have struggled to
determine whether a work is sufficiently "transformative" enough to defeat
a right of publicity claim. 12 5 In addition, some critics claim that the
decision fails to provide a clear standard since application of the elements
of the copyright fair use doctrine in courts are unpredictable and
inconsistent. 12 6 Other commentators argue that the decision and the
transformative test are far too narrow since the case involved an artist's
"nearly photographic reproduction" of the comedic trio.127 Scholars also
believe that the ambiguity of the "transformative" test will create a chilling
effect on the creation of future artistic works involving well-known
120 TCI Cablevision, 110 S.W.3d at 374.
121 Ham, supra note 30, at 569.
122

Hoffman, 255 F.3d at 1186 (citing Harte-Hanks Comme'n, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491

U.S. 657, 667 (1989)).
123 Casondra Kevorkian, Reinterpreting Jurisprudence: The Right of Publicity and
Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 37 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 85, 95 (2003).

124 Jasmer, supra note 20, at 303-04.
125 See Lee, supra note 118, at 493 (citing Winter v. D.C. Comics, 121 Cal. Rptr. 2d 431,
441-42 (Ct. App. 2002) (referring to the California appellate court's inability, as a matter of
law, to determine whether a work was sufficiently transformative)).
126 Jasmer, supra note 20, at 303-04.
127 Jireh Pub'g, 332 F.3d at 938 (commenting on Comedy III). See also McMillen &
Atkinson, supra note 50, at 139.
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celebrities and athletes. 128 In sum, because of the court's failure to perform
an in-depth analysis, the "transformative" test established, under the facts of
Comedy III, provide inadequate guidance for future courts to uniformly
apply. 129
The "artistic relevance" test has also shared a great deal of
criticism. 130 If applied too broadly, celebrities and athletes stand to
dramatically lose endorsements and licensing rights to their names and
images. 13 1 Rather than seek authorization from celebrities and athletes,
advertising and manufacturing companies who utilize famous images for
financial gain, can circumvent the right of publicity by merely adding some
artistic element. 13 2 In this sense, the "artistic relevance" test may provide
too much protection for artists and companies that use the name of another
by not considering the effect of the use on the individual. Similar to the
"transformative" test, the "artistic relevance" test "give[s] too little
consideration to the fact that many uses of a person's name and identity
have both expressive and commercial components. The tests operate to
preclude a cause of action whenever the use of the name and identity is in
13 3
any way expressive, regardless of commercial exploitation."'
With regards to the "predominant purpose" test adopted from a law
review article, the author admits that such a test "would, doubtless, be
difficult to apply in many circumstances." 134 The test seems to favor
protecting the celebrity or athlete over First Amendment rights. 135 One
commentator suggests that artists make a living by selling their art, and
therefore, the works can be considered commercial. 136 Thus, strict
applications of the "predominant purpose" test would likely cause a chilling
effect on artists who specialize in creating "expressive works of movie
stars, athletes, or political heroes. ' 137 Another critic of the test points to the
accepted view that when noncommercial and commercial speech are
inextricably intertwined, the speech is considered noncommercial as a
38
matter of law and thus, entitled to First Amendment protection.'
128 Jasmer, supra note 20, at 303-04.
129 Id.

130 See McMillen & Atkinson, supra note 50, at 139.
131 Id.
132 Id.

133 TCI Cablevision, 110 S.W.3d at 374 (referring to the "transformative" test).
134 Lee, supra note 118, at 500-01.
135 Michael S. Kruse, Missouri's Interfacing of the First Amendment and the Right of
Publicity: Is the "Predominant Purpose" Test Really that Desirable?, 69 Mo. L. REV. 799,
815 (2004).
136 Id.
137 Id.

138 Beall, supra note 98, at 32 (citing Riley v. Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind of North Carolina,
Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 796 (1988)).
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IV.
ADOPTING A 'FAIR USE' DEFENSE TO RIGHT OF PUBLICITY
CASES
Many scholars have considered the importation of the copyright fair
use doctrine into right of publicity law. 139 Courts have also relied on
particular factors of the fair use doctrine in order to establish workable
standards. 14 0 One court even went as far to state that "fair use can provide
a reasonable, systematic, and consistent frame of reference for evaluating
right of publicity matters."' 14 1 Likewise, there also have been several
arguments against the incorporation of the fair use doctrine in right of
publicity cases. 14 2 Some protesters state that some of the factors can only
be applied to a fixed tangible medium of expression. 143 Others state that the
fourth factor, the effect of the use upon the potential market, will always
fall in favor of finding a right of publicity violation. 14 4 However, an
application of a modified fair use doctrine might alleviate some, if not all of
these issues and provide a more adequate test for right of publicity cases.
This section explores the fair use doctrine as it is used in copyright law and
suggests that a modified fair use doctrine be adopted.
A. CopyrightLaw and the FairUse Doctrine
Copyright law at one point in time faced very similar issues to right
of publicity claims regarding the conflict between copyright protection and
the First Amendment. 14 5 To alleviate this conflict, the fair use doctrine was
adopted.1 4 6 Codified as a four part test by the Copyright Act of 1976, the
doctrine is intended to provide a "privilege to use copyright material in a
147
way that otherwise would be a violation of the copyright monopoly."'
139 See Stephen R. Barnett, The Right of Publicity Versus Free Speech in Advertising:
Some Counter-Points to Professor McCarthy, 18 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 593, 604

(1996) ("I would find a model for one such test in the 'fair use' doctrine of copyright law.").
See also Jasmer, supra note 20, at 305 (citing Gil Peles, Comedy III v. Saderup, 17
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 549, 566 (2002)) ("Another suggestion is simply to apply the entire
'fair use' standard used in copyright law to any right of publicity claim.").
140 See Comedy 11, 21 P.3d at 808 (relying on the first fair use factor to find justification
for the "transformative" test).
141 Apple Corps Ltd. v. Leber, 229 U.S.P.Q. 1015, 1017 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1986).
142 See Comedy II, 21 P.3d at 808 ("It is difficult to understand why these [fair use]
factors would be especially useful for determining whether the depiction of a celebrity
likeness is protected by the First Amendment.").
143 Id.
144 Jasmer, supra note 20, at 323.
145 Gil Peles, The Right of Publicity Gone Wild, II UCLA ENT. L. REv. 301, 312 (2004).
146 Id. at 323.
147 Douglas J. Ellis, The Right of Publicity and the First Amendment: A Comment on Why

Celebrity Parodiesare FairGamefor FairUse, 64 U. CIN. L. REv. 575, 599 (1996).
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The act states that:
In determining whether the use made of a work in any particular case is
a fair use the factors to be considered shall include - (1) the purpose
and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial
nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; (2) the nature of the
copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used
in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the effect of14the
8
use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.
9 As stated
The first factor is the purpose and character of the use. 14
by the Copyright Act of 1976, use of a copyrighted work for "purposes such
as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies
for classroom use), scholarship, or research," generally weighs the first
factor towards finding fair use. 150 However, with regards to this factor,
courts additionally consider whether the use is significantly transformative
and whether it is for commercial or non-commercial purposes. 15 1 For
example, the Supreme Court in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 152 in
examining the use of a copyrighted song for parody purposes stated that
"the more transformative the new work, the less will be the significance of
other factors, like commercialism, that may weigh against a find of fair
use." 15 3 The Court, in finding that the parody was made strictly for
commercial purposes, which weighs against a finding of fair use, held that
it was error for the lower appellate court to conclude that the commercial
nature of the parody alone rendered it presumptively unfair and in doing so,
stressed the importance of considering the other fair use factors before
making a determination of fair or unfair use.154
155
The second factor examines the nature of the copyrighted work.
Since the purpose of copyright law is to "promote science and the arts,"
fictional copyrighted works are afforded more copyright protection, as
opposed to factual works. 15 6 As articulated by the Supreme Court, "[t]he
law generally recognizes a greater need to disseminate factual works than
works of fiction or fantasy."' 157 Therefore, the use of a factual copyrighted

The Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2003).
149Id. at § 107(1).
150 Id. at § 107.
151Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569, 584-85 (1994).
152 Id.
153Id. at 579.
154See id. at 586-90, 594.
'55 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2003).
156 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579.
157Harper & Row Publishers,Inc. v. Nation Enter., 471 U.S. 539, 563 (1985).
148
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work would more likely weigh in favor of a finding of fair use.
The third factor of the fair use doctrine is the amount and
substantiality of the portion used of the copyrighted work. 15 8 The factor
examines whether the "quantity and the value" of the copyrighted work
used are "reasonable in relation to the purpose of the copying."' 15 9 "Here,
attention turns to the persuasiveness of a [copier]'s justification for the
particular copying done, and the inquiry will harken back to the first of the
statutory factors ....

that the extent of permissible copying varies with the

purpose and character of the use."' 16 0 In circumstances where the entire
copyrighted work was not used, the focus shifts to whether the "heart" of
the original work was appropriated. 16 1 Thus, even though the use of an
entire copyrighted work may favor a finding of unfair use, the copier may
still defend that use based on the purpose.
Regarded by the Supreme Court as "undoubtedly the single most
important element of fair use," 162 the fourth factor analyzes the effect of the
use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work. 163 This
factor requires a court to analyze not just the market impact of the use on
the copyrighted work but also "whether unrestricted and wide-spread
conduct of the sort engaged by the defendant" would detrimentally affect
the potential market of the original copyrighted work. 164 In considering
this factor, courts consider economic market harm by examining the
possibility of a decrease in the original copyrighted work's sales
potential. 165 Uses that are transformative, since they serve a different
market function and at many66times are directed to different consumers, thus
favors a finding of fair use.1
Overall, the four factors of the copyright fair use doctrine are "the
most clearly articulated approach to reconciling property and speech
interests in the intellectual property field." 167 Each factor must be applied
by a case-by-case analysis and weighed individually and then considered
together in order to protect the purposes of copyright. 168 Facing the same
issues as copyright law once did with the First Amendment, the right of
publicity area of law should borrow the concepts and rationale of copyright
158 17 U.S.C. § 107 (3).
159 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 586.
160 Id. at 586-87.
161 Id. at 587.
162 Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 566.

163 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1992).
164 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 590 (citing Harper& Row, 471 U.S. at 569).
165 See Ham, supra note 30, at 565.
166 Id.

167 See Lee, supra note 118, at 481-82.
168 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 577-78.
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169
law's fair use doctrine in order to achieve the same balance.

B. Adopting a Right of Publicity Fair Use Doctrine
I propose that a right of publicity fair use doctrine be adopted to
properly balance First Amendment rights and the right of publicity. The
three factors for the doctrine would be: 1) nature of the individual's
celebrated status 2) the purpose and character of the use of the individual's
identity; and 3) the potential effect of the use on that individual's identity.
The first factor would be an examination of the nature of the
individual's celebrated status. Courts have stated that one of the purposes
of right of publicity protection is to prevent unjust enrichment and thief of
an individual's good will. 170 This factor is deeply intertwined with the
"predominant purpose" and "actual malice" test, in that it would require the
court to analyze why the user appropriated the individual's name or
likeness. In assessing this factor, the court would have to determine the
purpose of the use and then whether that purpose was to profit strictly on
the individual's good will or deliberately mislead consumers to create a
false impression. Naturally, it would be most enticing for businesses and
advertisers to use the identity of famous persons, since they are in the
public spotlight. Thus, this factor also would consider how the individual is
known and to what capacity to the public, in relation to how the
individual's identity is used. For the purposes of this factor, if the use is not
related to why or how the individual is known to the public, then it is more
likely that the user is being unjustly enriched by the good will of the
individual. If the use is related, then analysis of the other two factors would
help to determine whether the use is a fair use. For example, if a famous
graceful dancer was parodied in a commercial by a distasteful dancer, then
the distasteful dancer is less likely riding on the famous dancer's good will
as opposed to having an impersonator of the famous dancer in a commercial
advertising a product unrelated to dancing. In summary, if the use of the
identity relates to how the individual is known, the more likely this factor
weighs in favor of an unfair use.
The second factor of the right of publicity fair use doctrine would be
the purpose and character of the use of the individual's identity. As
explained in Comedy III, the ideals and rationale for considering this factor
are the same as the "transformative" test. 17 1 By using an individual's
identity and creating a new expression or message by adding something
new, the right of publicity goal of encouragement of free expression and
169 See generally Peles, supra note 145 (suggesting a right of publicity fair use test

through a two-pronged analysis).
170 See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
171See supra note 96 and accompanying text.

BUFFALO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LA WJOURNAL

[Vol 4:1

creativity are achieved. 172 The court in assessing this factor, must
determine whether the use is sufficiently transformative enough to manifest
the user's own artistic expression and whether the use is for commercial or
non-commercial purposes. 173 Additionally, borrowing from copyright law,
a use of an individual's identity for the purposes such as criticism, comment
(including parody), teaching or research should also weigh this factor in
favor of finding fair use. 174 Therefore, as in the copyright fair use doctrine,
considering these purposes, the more transformative a use of an identity is,
the more likely this factor favors finding fair use.
Closely related to the second factor and perhaps the most important
factor, the last element would be the potential effect of the use on that
individual's identity. The right of publicity is meant to protect the
commercial value of an individual's identity. 17 5 As a result, this factor
would appropriately examine how the particular use and similar
"unrestricted and wide-spread"' 176 uses affects the individual's identity.
This factor also bears the same principals as the "actual malice" and
"predominant purpose" tests by considering whether the defendant
intentionally exploited and usurped the commercial value of the
individual's identity and thereby causing a resulting injury. 17 7
For
example, in right of publicity cases involving celebrities and athletes,
unauthorized exploitations of their identities in a negative or false light
could greatly cost them lucrative endorsements and sponsorships
opportunities. 178 Furthermore, the purpose of right of publicity is not to
prevent hurt feelings or humiliation. 179 Absent the showing of anything
more than emotional distress, this factor would weigh in favor of the
appropriator of the individual's identity.
As with the preexisting tests, this is not to say that adopting these
factors will establish clear guidelines. However by incorporating all the
mentioned tests into one balancing test standard, the courts would be better
able to consider all the relevant issues. Just as the copyright fair use
doctrine is regarded as a limitation on the monopoly granted by copyright
protection, 180 the suggested modified fair use test would afford some

172 Comedy II, 21 P.3d at 808.

173 See supra notes 96, 151 and accompanying texts.
174 See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
175Haelan., 202 F.2d at 868.
176 See note 164 and accompanying text.
177 See note 120 and accompanying text.
178 Dannean J. Hetzel, Professional Athletes and Sports Teams: The Nexus of Their
Identity Protection, 11 SPORTs LAW. J.141, 155 (2004).

179 Cardtoons, 95 F.3d at 976.
180 John Tehranian, Et Tu, Fair Use? The Triumph of Natural-Law Copyright, 38 U.C.

DAVIS L. REv. 465, 495 (2005).
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protection to celebrities and athletes, while at the same time allow others to
use their likenesses in a manner that ultimately results in creativity and
protects progress of the arts. One case has already briefly considered all
these factors in a right of publicity dispute without actually establishing
them as elements.
In Cardtoons v. Major League Baseball Players Association,18 1 a
parody trading cards company produced trading cards containing
caricatures of famous baseball players and humorous commentary about
their careers, ridiculing the players using a variety of themes. 182 The Major
League Baseball Players Association claimed that these cards violated the
players' right of publicity. 183 The United States Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit found that parody trading cards of famous baseball players
fell within the scope of First Amendment protection and outweighed the
players' right of publicity. 184 Among other considerations in the court's
analysis, the court noted that the parody cards had commentary related to
185
the individual's career and reputation in professional baseball world.
The court also stated that parody as a form of self-expression was an
invaluable means to social criticism in the market place of ideas and that
within the cards, the company had added "a significant creative component
186
of its own to the celebrity identity and created an entirely new product."'
Finally, in reaching its conclusion that the parody cards were privileged
under the First Amendment, the court reasoned that "even without the right
of publicity rights, celebrities would still be able to reap financial reward
from authorized appearances and endorsements." 187 Ultimately, the court
in Cardtoons arrived to the right conclusion by considering all the
appropriate factors and finding that all the suggested factors in the proposed
standard weighed in favor of the parody card company.
V.
CONCLUSION
Had the First Amendment issue been raised in the Ali case
mentioned earlier, one has to wonder whether the outcome would have been
different. Applying the three factors of the proposed right of publicity fair
use doctrine, the district court might have found that the Ali's parody
portrait related to his boxing career, that the portrait was an artistic
18195 F.3d 959 (10th Cir. 1996).
182 Cardtoons, 95 F.3d at 962-63.
183 Id. at 962.
184 Cardtoons, 95 F.3d at 976.
185 Id. at 962.
186 Id. at 972, 976.
187 Id. at 974.
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expression used for commentary purposes, and would not have greatly
affected his identity's potential market value. Overall, an examination of
how some courts have tried or refused to develop a workable standard
indicates that these courts have appropriately recognized the undeniable
tension that exists between the right of publicity and First Amendment
rights. By adopting a right of publicity fair use doctrine similar to
copyright law, courts will be better able to balance the unauthorized use of
one's identity, while at the same time protect First Amendment rights.
Additionally, adoption of this standard is essential in order to provide
adequate protection to individuals whose name or likenesses are used,
encourage creative artistic expressions, and to provide a more uniform body
of intellectual property law.

